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ABSTRACT

This monograph is a history of the Caribbean News Agency (CANA), which is jointly owned by private and public mass media of its region and independent of both governments and foreign news agencies. It is proposed that CANA may provide a unique model of an independent, regional third-world news agency. Sections of the monograph examine (1) CANA's West Indian setting; (2) background factors from 1962 to 1976, particularly the precipitating factors during 1967-1976 that led to the emergence of CANA; and (3) the salient components of CANA's operation, including its ownership and control, subscribers and staff, news sources and channels, messages and receivers, and internal operations and policies. A concluding section of the monograph lists five things to be learned from the development and operation of CANA that can be applied to the future development of third world news agencies. (RL)

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MARLENE CUTHBERT

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MARLENE CUTHBERT
*The Caribbean News Agency:
Third World Model*

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NEWS AGENCIES increased dramatically in number after World War II, more than half originating in the third world.¹ However, the world-wide collection and distribution of news was largely carried out by only five large international agencies from four developed countries.² By the 1970s, a lively international debate had focused on the effect of these news agencies on the developing world.³ Some developing countries regarded international news agencies as perpetrators of third world dependency, a dependency which was often already considerable because of limited resources and in many cases a history of colonialism. In an effort to alter the news flow balance, some developing countries began to cooperate to form regional agencies.⁴ The Caribbean is one region in the third world where nations have banded together to improve news flow, and this resulted in the formation of the Caribbean News Agency (CANA) in 1976. Although the Commonwealth Caribbean,⁵ like much of the developing world, has a colonial history and limited resources, its new news agency presented unusual ownership and control patterns. Most third world news agencies were directly owned and operated by governments,⁶ while two Latin American regional agencies which were privately owned had financial, managerial or editorial input from foreign agencies.⁷ CANA, on the other hand, is jointly owned by private and public mass media of its region, and is independent of both governments and foreign news agencies. CANA thus may provide a unique model of an independent, regional third world news agency.

This monograph, after briefly tracing the agency and its West Indian setting, examines the background and precipitating factors in the emergence of CANA during the period 1962 to 1976 and describes and discusses the nature and implications of the resulting agency.

News Agencies and News Flow

Expansion of the international news agencies tended to follow the territorial and economic expansion of their home countries and was facilitated by submarine cables.⁸ International news transmission channels thus came to be based largely on the economic and political links established between nations with similar cultural heritages such as Britain and the United States, and between colonial powers and their colonies. This resulted in a heavy two-way flow of information on an east-west axis between the United States and Britain, and a heavy one-way flow on a north-south axis from the developed to the developing world. Only a trickle of news flowed northward because no world news agencies were based in the southern hemisphere. Analysts who documented this disparity in the 1960s and 1970s found that, as compared with developed nations, developing nations received far less volume and variety of news coverage.⁹

Communication researchers have identified the relationship between third world news media and international news agencies as one of dependency, specifically cultural dependency.¹⁰ A monograph by Dodson and Hachten shows that African media depended heavily on foreign content, relying almost entirely on the world news agencies "for news not only about the world but about themselves and their neighbors."¹¹ John T. McNelly, observing in 1975 that the Latin American news market was dominated by the developed world, pointed out that the growth of national and regional consciousness had brought the demand for improved communications in Latin America, and that one effect of this demand was to lessen the almost exclusive dependence on the global news agencies.¹² Caribbean countries as well were heavily dependent on international news agencies to interpret the world to them and also to interpret them to the world: Caribbean news dependency was evident in the fact that neighboring English-speaking islands were able to receive news of each other only by means of links to London, or, in the case of neighboring English and French islands, links to and between London and Paris.¹³

Thus, as a consequence of the control of world news flow by a very few channels, many countries experienced severe cultural dependency. One possible reason for the third world's concern about such dependency was pointed out by Sophia Peterson in a study of

criteria of newsworthiness. She found that cultural differences affected news selection and suggested that cultural bias might be an important element in explaining why the third world often considers western news coverage inadequate.¹⁴

Wilbur Schramm observed in 1964 that a key factor in creating news flow imbalance lay in the imbalance in the development of news services.¹⁵ Although many new nations singly established news agencies after World War II, they often lacked the financial and other resources to make a significant contribution to the international flow of news. This was the situation in the Commonwealth Caribbean prior to CANA's formation.

West Indian Identity

Historically, the West Indies shared the experiences of colonialism, slavery and the plantation system, and this resulted in similar racial origins, language and institutions, as well as in characteristic attitudes, values and psychological make-up.¹⁶ However, these similarities were not apparent to the inhabitants because each West Indian colony related to, and was almost completely dependent on a mother country, rather than nearby neighbors. Economic relationships between the colonies and mother countries were based on a closed circuit trading system known as the "triangular trade" in which English ships carried manufactured goods to West Africa to be exchanged for Black slaves who were brought to the islands to be exchanged for colonial produce, mainly sugar.¹⁷ Thus, the British colonies were organized to fulfill, not their own needs, but the needs of the mother country.

The links with Britain included communication links designed to tie the colonies to the mother country rather than to each other.¹⁸ Throughout the colonial period, most West Indian mass media remained dependent, and regional media were virtually absent. This historical pattern accounted largely for a high degree of extra-regional control of the mass media: in the 1960s almost all major West Indian media were owned by outside commercial interests such as the Thomson, Mirror and Rediffusion groups of England.¹⁹ To collect foreign news, individual Caribbean media after World War II negotiated their own arrangements with international news agencies. This meant that, except for the few systems which could afford correspondents in other Caribbean countries, regional news

coverage was limited to items considered important enough to be inserted in the world services of an international agency, and then fed back to the member systems.²⁰

The first efforts at West Indian regionalism, initiated by the British for reasons of administrative expediency, were varying degrees of political union culminating in 1958 with the formation of a West Indies Federation.²¹ The Federation collapsed by 1962, however. Jamaica—and Trinidad and Tobago—became independent individually in the same year, followed shortly by other larger territories.²²

Many scholars attribute the failure of Federation to the lack of a sense of West Indian identity and dependency on non-Caribbean sources, particularly in economic and sociocultural areas.²³ These were perceived to result in part from a lack of regional information and cultural expression through mass media channels.²⁴

Until 1962, then, the West Indian experience was almost wholly colonial.²⁵ The islands' dependence on Britain as separate units resulted in the individual island being the largest unit to which most West Indians felt allegiance. The dependence which characterized West Indian societies in general was very evident in their mass media, which, as the independence period began, remained largely extensions of the British mass media.

BACKGROUND FACTORS 1962-1976

After the mid-twentieth century, the theme of dependency dominated scholarly works on Caribbean institutions and integration. The Oxford-educated prime minister of Trinidad and Tobago described Caribbean dependency as economic, cultural, institutional, intellectual and psychological.²⁶ Some analysts recommended forming indigenous institutions or adapting imported institutions to Caribbean needs and priorities,²⁷ recommendations which grew out of a perception that achieving greater independence in the Caribbean was bound up with questions of ownership and control. Locally owned institutions would help generate local leadership and decision-making; without these, said the foreign minister of Guyana, "political independence is a shibboleth."²⁸ Hence, as independence began, Caribbean leaders who perceived continuing dependency and lack of identity in the region began to focus on non-

political aspects of independence, particularly the economic and sociocultural.

Economic Factors

Believing that political independence had little meaning without a greater degree of economic independence, governments began to hold annual Heads of Government conferences to explore the basis for regional cooperation. Out of these conferences came several new regional institutions designed to bring about some measure of integration: a Caribbean Free Trade Association (Carifta); a Commonwealth Caribbean Regional Secretariat to coordinate Carifta and implement decisions of the Heads of Government meetings; a Regional Development Agency, and a Caribbean Development Bank.

Successful cooperative efforts led, by 1973, to the creation of a Caribbean Community (Caricom) which embraced three broad areas of cooperation: 1) economic integration by means of a Caribbean Common Market to replace Carifta; 2) functional cooperation in non-economic fields such as health, education, examinations, shipping, air transport, meteorology and research, and 3) coordination of the foreign policies of the independent member states.²⁹

In 1975 an evaluation of Caricom and the Common Market by the president of the Caribbean Development Bank, William Demas, stated that progress in laying the foundations for cooperation had been reasonably good.³⁰ He pointed out, however, that more ownership and control of regional resources were needed, and that the objectives and nature of Caricom were not being projected in the Caribbean. Demas asserted that, on balance, the mass media played a negative role in promoting economic independence and internally propelled development. He asserted that the Caribbean Community could not succeed without better popular understanding of what the community was about by means of better communication and information among the people of the region.³¹ This perception, as well as his conviction about the need for more local ownership and control of regional resources, caused Demas to look forward to the establishment of a Caribbean-owned news agency.³²

Sociocultural Factors

Many analysts of the region believed the problems of Caribbean dependency and lack of identity would not be solved by economic developments alone, that greater sociocultural awareness and coop-

eration were essential. Historian Eric Williams saw Caribbean dependency as a "state of mind" stemming from a long history of colonialism which he believed crippled self-confidence and self-reliance and set up a "vicious circle" of dependence.³³ He suggested that an increased sense of Caribbean identity required efforts on cultural as well as economic levels, and pointed to the mass media as one of the dependent institutions which needed to give it more expression. A study by a Trinidadian political scientist also identified cultural dependency as a factor militating against integration in the colonial and post-colonial West Indies.³⁴ Another Caribbean scholar pointed out that achieving a sense of regionalism was difficult on the cultural level because, as in many third world nations, the imposition of colonial value patterns had resulted in ties of culture with the mother country prevailing over regional cultural ties.³⁵ A major architect of regional integration, economist William Demas, stressed that media were important cultural instruments for increasing identity and decreasing dependency.³⁶

The coming of independence stimulated the growth of socio-cultural awareness which resulted in a variety of cooperative efforts in areas such as the arts, education, the church and the mass media.

National independence gave impetus to artistic creativity in painting and sculpture, literature, music, the dance and theater.³⁷ Governments began a limited fostering of the cultural renaissance by means of local and regional art festivals, exchange visits of theater groups, and finally, in 1972, the inauguration of a Caribbean Festival of the Arts (Carifesta) which brought together artists from a variety of fields and commissioned literary publications. After Carifesta, the Heads of Government decided that "to promote greater cultural cooperation among the countries of the region" they would institutionalize the festival, holding it in a different Caribbean country triennially.³⁸

Various commentators considered that some West Indian values were inappropriate to a society in quest of economic and cultural independence, and identified education as a crucial area for changing values. Appropriate values were those that could instill a sense of pride and self-confidence which were regarded as critical for creating a feeling of Caribbean unity and identity.³⁹ Colonial education had been designed to transmit European culture and values to West Indian children; the structure, textbooks and examinations

were British, and no higher education was available in the colonies. The result was that West Indian intellectuals studied in Britain and were socialized into the British value system.

Awareness of the need for West Indian-educated leadership led to the establishment, after World War II, of a University of the West Indies which became a regional thinking center. As graduates came to occupy senior posts in the islands, their familiarity with the West Indian environment led them to search for local solutions to West Indian problems. They began to develop new conceptualizations of, and insights into, West Indian economic, social and political processes, and to write textbooks with a focus on the region. Throughout the 1960s and 1970s, university staff members started a variety of academic journals and organized conferences with a Caribbean focus.⁴⁰

By 1975 West Indian governments could point to the fact that West Indian textbooks were available in many fields for the primary and secondary school systems; a new Caribbean Examinations Council had formulated a timetable to transfer the setting of secondary examinations from British bodies to itself; curriculum changes were being instituted, and, as finances permitted, secondary education was becoming available to a much wider cross-section of the population. Further, the non-standard dialect spoken by the majority of the people was increasingly given recognition and legitimacy by educators with a concomitant lessening of negative effects on the West Indian sense of identity.⁴¹

The church in the West Indies was one of the few institutions regularly in touch with people at the community level, and high levels of church attendance meant that it could have broad influence. The church was also one of the earliest institutions to transcend national barriers, as it was usually administered regionally by various Christian denominations from Europe and North America. With the coming of independence, the church as a whole became more West Indian in personnel and orientation, and developed a much greater awareness of its regional role. It displayed much concern about the Caribbean search for identity and the growth of cultural, economic and political independence.⁴² In 1969 the churches formed an ecumenical development organization, Christian Action for Development in the Caribbean, which aimed to promote self-help and contribute to the material, cultural and spiritual well be-

ing of Caribbean people. In the early 1970s this organization began the first regional newspaper, *Caribbean Contact*; established a publishing house to provide an outlet for writers on Caribbean topics; started a documentation service with current information on a variety of regional concerns; organized the region's first annual training course for communicators; produced a regular radio program on Caribbean concerns; held seminars and conferences and published materials on regional issues.⁴³ Various outside commentators observed that the church was beginning to put down indigenous roots and assist in correcting economic and social injustices.⁴⁴

Caribbean mass media, in 1972, were still dependent and largely irrelevant, according to a study by the American communications researcher, John Lent. Lent observed that, despite political independence, ownership and content often remained in foreign hands.⁴⁵ Throughout the late 1960s and early 1970s Commonwealth Caribbean groups and individuals from media, church, university and government frequently called for changes in mass media, criticizing them as institutions which reinforced Caribbean dependency and failed to assist the development of West Indian identity. Many of these groups made the assumption that more appropriate communications through the media would in some way lessen dependency and contribute to a West Indian identity. Comments by the Caribbean Regional Secretariat are typical:

Many of the problems of the Region have been, in the main, due to mutual ignorance and misunderstanding among the countries resulting from the lack of intra-regional mass communications. . . . The role of the mass media in promoting regional cooperation and regional economic and social development cannot be stressed too much. For in the process of economic and social transformation of a country or region, one of the most important aspects is the image of the world and of himself which the ordinary citizen derives from the mass media.⁴⁶

Economist William Demas believed that the process of West Indian decolonization lagged in the field of mass communication,⁴⁷ and participants in a 1975 communication workshop called on mass media to "consciously reinforce" the West Indian's "struggling sense of individual worth and cultural identity."⁴⁸

Some Caribbean people believed that the ownership of mass media and telecommunications in the region contributed to dependency.⁴⁹ In 1968 four of the seven big West Indian dailies and three of the six big Sunday papers were owned by the same foreign

publishing interest, the Thomson group, and half of the fifteen radio stations were foreign-owned.⁵⁰ The telecommunications infrastructure of the Commonwealth Caribbean was also in foreign hands, being owned by Cable and Wireless, a London-based company. A private newspaper editor expressed the sentiments of a number of Caribbean people when he wrote that Caribbean vehicles of information must be owned and controlled by persons with more than financial interest in the region or the region ran the risk of being inundated by foreign concepts and values.⁵¹

The subject of news flow received attention in the Caribbean during the early years of independence. A 1968 survey by Unesco found that the Commonwealth Caribbean relied almost totally on foreign agencies—Reuters, AP and UPI—for news both from abroad and from neighboring territories.⁵² During the 1960s and 1970s Caribbean mass media formed two regional associations to promote media interests, including the flow of news and information. Several of the print and broadcast media formed the Caribbean Publishers and Broadcasters Association (CPBA) under whose umbrella the major mass media arranged a block contract to subscribe to Reuters World Service. The Caribbean Broadcasting Union (CBU), formed in 1970, did much to facilitate regional media cooperation and information exchange, particularly by producing current affairs and cultural programs on each country. These were broadcast throughout the region and, in addition, daily newspapers carried a series of supplements tied to what the broadcasters had done. As a result of such practical steps in cooperation, media people began to move around the region, and knowledge of each other grew. For the first time, print and broadcast media began to see themselves as organizations with common interests. Further, cooperation between private and state-owned systems within the CBU helped to break down the region's traditional opposition to state-owned media. Hugh Cholmondeley, director-general of the CBU, expressed the conviction that these were important background factors in the evolution of CANA.⁵³

These successful cooperative efforts in both economic and socio-cultural spheres created a climate of confidence that regional efforts were realistic and viable, and led to a desire for increased regional communication. As a result, many concerned people called for a greater regional orientation of the mass media, including the

establishment of a Caribbean news agency. For example, participants in a 1972 workshop in communication and development recommended a regional agency as did a 1974 conference of Caribbean media, government and university personnel.⁵⁴ Some Caribbean leaders perceived such a news agency to be an important adjunct to the regional institutions formed after independence, and hoped that, by providing increased and more relevant information, it would promote the economic and sociocultural integration of the region.

PRECIPITATING FACTORS 1967-1976

The factors which precipitated CANA's emergence include events and developments over a nine-year period involving institutions both internal and external to the region: the regional governments, regional mass media, Unesco and Reuters.

Government Initiative and Unesco Response

In 1967 the Fourth Heads of Government Conference of the Commonwealth Caribbean unanimously agreed upon a resolution calling for the establishment of a regional news agency. This resolution was based on consciousness that "regional thinking and awareness is the essential basis for the effective working of regional institutions" and that the mass media "provided inadequate coverage for regional events and policies."⁵⁵

Implementation of the resolution began when the Caribbean Regional Secretariat, acting on behalf of the governments, invited Unesco to conduct a feasibility study. Unesco sent two consultants to survey the region in late 1968.⁵⁶ The Unesco team reported that it was only through the press, radio and television that the people of the Caribbean could be made aware of the wider trading area of which they formed a part, and that the economic grouping of Carifta provided a framework parallel to which the institutions necessary for the development of regional mass communication could be built. Their survey found a prevailing contention that foreign-controlled mass media were interested mainly in the commercial side of their operation. The Thomson papers, for example, expended no funds on coordinating the regional newsgathering po-

tential of their several newspapers, relying only on Reuters for regional coverage.

The Unesco team noted that in 1968 Reuters began to increase its Commonwealth Caribbean coverage by switching its Caribbean Desk from London to Barbados. The Barbados Desk employed a staff of six, maintained stringers in thirteen countries of the region and transmitted about 25,000 words a day of which 3,000 were Caribbean news.⁵⁷ Reuters Caribbean Service was fed to fifteen subscribers in five countries through a block contract between Reuters and the CPBA. However, for technical and financial reasons, the Caribbean service could not be supplied to several regional media which received only a daily cabled summary of world and regional news. The Unesco team found that most Caribbean media recognized the introduction of the Reuters service as a major improvement in regional coverage, although a major weakness was its inability to reach many of the media. Its limited geographic spread resulted from the high cost of telecommunication facilities. Other weaknesses identified were the lack of in-depth features, lack of photo coverage, and the foreign origin of the service.

The only other world news agencies with several subscribers in the region were AP and UPI; both maintained a network of local stringers. Surveys of Caribbean newspapers conducted before and after the establishment of Reuters' Caribbean Desk found the number of regional items carried on the increase.⁵⁸ Nevertheless, the situation remained one in which world news agencies were responsible for not only the flow of news into and out of the region, but also for the regional exchange of news.

The Unesco study found that the idea of an indigenous news agency received almost unanimous support from the managers and editors of the mass media, but that they wanted the agency to be organized, as far as possible, independent both from the governments and from the large foreign publishing and broadcasting groups. Therefore the study recommended the establishment of a regional news agency built on the foundation of the efficient regional service provided by Reuters. Though the Unesco team thought that, ideally, CANA would be organized as a cooperative agency owned and operated by its member organizations, they believed that world experience had shown that cooperative ownership and control of news agencies was rarely possible in countries where the media had

limited audiences and financial resources. For this reason they recommended that CANA should be a public corporation with at least a partly cooperative character, which they felt would ensure its autonomy. Government participation would ensure financial and technical support.

Reaction by Governments and Media

Caribbean governments were divided on the question of government involvement in the ownership and operation of a regional news agency. Most participants in the 1967 Heads of Government Conference had assumed that only governments had the financial resources to take responsibility for the initiatives proposed by their resolution on the need for regional news exchange and that, if a news agency proved feasible, it would be owned and operated by governments.⁵⁹ However, some governments thought they should be involved only if it became clear that the media could not start an agency, while other governments were reluctant to have any governmental control of a news agency.⁶⁰ The Unesco team isolated some of the reasons for such reservations.

Certain governments expressed the fear that such a regional institution might create political friction between the participating countries, that some governments might try to interfere with its work to the disadvantage of others, and that a composite structure based on the delicate regional balance might not work efficiently. Other possible sources of friction which government personnel pointed out were the siting and staffing of the agency and representation on its administrative board. Some of the bigger countries felt that they would be giving away to others much more than they would receive, while smaller islands feared they might be flooded by information from their more prosperous neighbors, and that their people would become restless on learning about speedier progress elsewhere.⁶¹ In spite of intergovernmental suspicion and other reservations, the Heads of Government gave formal approval in 1969 to the Unesco team's recommendations for the establishment of an indigenous agency. They also accepted the team's suggestion that a regional Mass Communications Project should be established to implement the news agency and other communications-related recommendations. The governments decided that the Caribbean Secre-

tariat in Guyana should be the headquarters of the Project and that Carifta would coordinate it on their behalf.⁶²

As a result of conversations with media personnel, the Unesco team observed that the mass media were "generally, and understandably suspicious of government participation in any news organization."⁶³ This suspicion became, in fact, the biggest barrier to the development of a Caribbean news agency in the years immediately following the survey. Caribbean media executives considered the report of the Unesco team at CPBA meetings in 1969 and 1970 but the idea of a news agency with participation by governments was flatly rejected.⁶⁴ In the words of one newspaper editor, suggestions of government involvement even in part ownership of the news agency aroused "suspicion and fear about the vital question of freedom of the press."⁶⁵ As a consequence virtual stalemate ensued for three years.⁶⁶

Thus, it was Caribbean governments that initiated the formal discussion about a regional news agency and were instrumental in inviting an external institution, Unesco, to survey its feasibility, but it was the governments themselves who were divided on the question of government control. Further, the Caribbean mass media took no action largely because they would not share ownership with governments. Five more years were to elapse before means were found to cope with this obstacle and the next obstacle to arise, that of financing a regional news agency.

Reuters Raises Its Rates

Eventually, cooperation of Caribbean mass media on a news agency was precipitated by another institution external to the region, Reuters news agency. At the CPBA's annual meeting in 1971 Reuters announced that it would increase the cost of its Caribbean service by 63% in the following three years. The region's biggest daily, the *Jamaica Gleaner*, which was paying the largest percentage of the CPBA's block contract with Reuters, did not feel the increase was justified and declared it would withdraw from the contract, depend on the AP for world news, and establish its own stringer service throughout the area.⁶⁷

The *Gleaner's* action put the other subscribers to Reuters in the position of having to face their own increases as well as take up the

Gleaner subscription. Feeling that they could not bear the increased costs alone, the CPBA membership decided to terminate the contract. They wrote to inform Reuters that, as of August 31, 1972, each of the media would make its own arrangements.⁶⁸ Thus, Caribbean media were forced to seek alternative arrangements, and they began serious discussion on the desirability of establishing a regional news agency.

The UNDP/UNESCO Mass Communications Project

In response to the 1969 Heads of Government request, UNDP agreed to assist regional governments in financing a Mass Communications Project under the auspices of Unesco to facilitate discussions among the media and with Reuters. Three communications advisers were assigned to the project, which was coordinated by Hugh Cholmondeley of Guyana, the director-general of the Guyana Broadcasting Service. The advisers had to consider a wide range of views, including those of national governments, foreign-owned, privately-owned and state-owned media, the Heads of Government Conference, larger and smaller territories, Reuters and Cable and Wireless.⁶⁹

They found that the media did not feel that they could consider establishing their own agency as an alternative to Reuters because the Heads of Government had indicated their intention to establish a regional agency. Media professionals believed they should have been consulted about the decision to establish a news agency. They felt left out of the development at the discussion stages and their fundamental question was, in the words of Cholmondeley, "How can we be sure that a Caribbean News Agency will subscribe to basic professional and ethical positions of freedom of the press and credibility of an agency, that we individually hold as working communicators?"⁷⁰ Cholmondeley isolated two major reservations on the part of the mass media: 1) that media managers felt sharing the cost of the news agency with governments was untenable, "as direct or indirect government participation in a venture of this nature would unquestionably affect the agency's credibility";⁷¹ 2) that privately owned media felt there would be essentially little difference between direct government participation in the proposed news agency and participation by state-owned media. According to Cholmondeley, these two questions remained paramount irrespec-

tive of the question of economic viability of the proposed agency. Hence the overriding concern of the project advisors was to resolve these difficulties.⁷²

The concerns of the media were discussed in great detail at a meeting of government information officials held at the Caribbean Regional Secretariat in Guyana, February 21-23, 1972. For the first time, the CPBA and the newly-formed CBU were represented at a meeting of this nature. The meeting recommended that government participation in a regional news agency would be unnecessary, and that the media should investigate setting up CANA with their own resources. Consequently, the secretary general of Carifta wrote the Heads of Government early in March, 1972, explaining the situation and asking them to withdraw from their 1967 position so as to give the media a chance to examine whether they themselves could establish an agency.⁷³ The governments agreed to a proposal that the news agency should be formed as a non-profit organization owned by its subscribers. Profits if any would be channelled back into the organization for expansion and improvement of the service. Government assistance would be restricted to negotiation for the lowering of regional communications charges affecting news and information exchange.

As a result of the changed position, media executives met in Barbados in June, 1972, at the invitation of the UNDP/UNESCO Project to decide the future of the agency.⁷⁴ Representatives of Reuters were invited to the meetings as it was clear that no arrangements could be made for an indigenous agency before the planned termination of the contract with Reuters, two months later. The participants negotiated an interim arrangement with Reuters, giving the media time to reach a formal decision on CANA's establishment. The Barbados meeting acknowledged the delegates' appreciation for the pioneering tasks of Reuters, and complimented the agency on the quality of its service to the media of the area. However, the statement also expressed the wish that further development and expansion of a regional service should be in the hands of the media.⁷⁵

The UNDP/UNESCO Project team summarized the results of detailed discussions held with the *Gleaner* company. Theodore Sealey, the editor, and Tom Sherman, the managing director, had indicated that the *Gleaner* did not wish to participate in any re-

gional news agency, choosing rather to serve its needs by means of its own network of correspondents and stringers.⁷⁶ That meant the *Gleaner* could not be counted on to help with the cost.

At the Barbados meeting, executives from the privately-owned and state-owned media also exchanged views about the question of impartiality and objectivity of the proposed agency. They held long discussions on a formula for its management, as well as on alternative ways of computing subscription fees. They made unanimous decisions that:

1. The formation of the Caribbean News Agency is desirable, assuming that the costs of the services are acceptable [and that]

2. A transitional period of "phasing out" of the Reuters Caribbean Service and "phasing in" of the Caribbean News Agency should be negotiated with Reuters.⁷⁷

Thus the decisive factor in the formation of the news agency was now economic. Specifically, the media executives agreed to spend the amount then paid to Reuters for a comparable service, elected a steering committee to oversee the agency and draft a charter making "efforts to ensure that CANA is insulated from outside interference"⁷⁸ and requested Unesco to find someone skilled in news agency operations to advise them. Unesco sent the assistant general manager of the Danish News Agency, Jorgen de Cros Dich, who conducted a second feasibility study in late 1972.

De Cros Dich identified the primary motive of Caribbean media for wanting to establish their own news agency as a financial one; however, his figures indicated that a Caribbean agency would cost twice as much as the arrangement with Reuters. The secondary motive, according to de Cros Dich, was a concern for regional news coverage which he suggested could be broadened by establishing links with Cuba's news agency, Prensa Latina, and possibly with Agence France-Presse in the French islands. He proposed a draft constitution for CANA aimed at safeguarding the independence of the agency from political, economic and other pressure groups.⁷⁹

Throughout 1973 and 1974 both media and government personnel discussed the formation of CANA. The dominant view of the Heads of Government Conference was that a Caribbean news agency should be established by the media. At a press conference during the 1974 Heads of Government Conference, Prime Minister Michael Manley of Jamaica stated that the Caribbean needed a regional service badly, and noted: "We cannot stop the metropolitan

world from interpreting itself through the wire services. But we must recognize that the Caribbean, the black world, the Third World, the disadvantaged world, has its own view of the world and needs to be aware of that view."⁸⁰

The media were generally supportive of the idea of a regional agency, although the *Gleaner* was still concerned about possible government involvement. A Trinidad *Express* editorial stated that the CPBA should accept the challenge of setting up CANA, because any delay might lead politicians to seize the initiative, and this "would be totally unacceptable to the Caribbean people" because "CANA should be a politically unfettered news source."⁸¹ The editor of Jamaica's privately owned *Daily News* also argued in favor of CANA as necessary to complement foreign news agencies such as AP and Reuters which he believed were mainly interested in profit and sometimes distorted reports of Caribbean activities.⁸²

The fear that CANA would involve higher costs was, according to Hugh Cholmondeley, based on false premises. He pointed out at a CPBA meeting in 1974 that the de Cros Dich report had significantly overestimated some costs and that "if like were compared with like, the cost of a CANA service similar in scope to the Reuter Caribbean service would hardly exceed the present CPBA contribution."⁸³

A third and final study of CANA's feasibility conducted in 1974 by a group called the CANA Mission under the auspices of the UNDP/UNESCO Project⁸⁴ found Reuters' foreign coverage generally acceptable to the media, and recommended that Reuters be the basis of CANA's foreign news file. However, some media executives wanted CANA to present world news in a Caribbean perspective, and to select foreign stories of greater relevance to the region. In addition, most media wanted more coverage of South and Central America and more in-depth reports from the rest of the developing world, especially Africa. Media personnel considered Reuters Caribbean coverage inadequate and asked for more news from Commonwealth Caribbean countries as well as from the wider Caribbean area. The electronic media criticized the fact that the service was heavily newspaper-oriented in both presentation and timing.

The CANA Mission proposed that CANA extend the range of telecommunications within the Commonwealth Caribbean and eventually with the countries of the wider Caribbean and, through

them, with Latin America, Africa and Asia. The Mission team drafted an agreement with Cuba's news agency, Prensa Latina, providing for the daily exchange of two hours of news with CANA by way of the circuitry between Kingston, Jamaica, and Havana. Prensa Latina had an extensive news file; in addition to maintaining correspondents in 25 countries, it subscribed to Reuters, AFP and TASS, as well as Spanish, Italian and Romanian news agencies and the Third World News Pool. The CANA Mission also investigated the marketing of specialized services such as a financial service, commodity and business service, and sugar, bauxite and tourism service, believing that services in these areas could realize revenue which would contribute to the agency's expansion.

CANA's Political Independence

The CANA Mission held discussions with almost all media managers of the region and found that, as in the past, one of the most sensitive issues was the question of guarantees as to CANA's political integrity and impartiality. The Mission felt, however, that media officials often mistakenly equated the functions of a news agency serving a wide spectrum of subscribers with those of the conventional newspaper, which had the responsibility to produce opinion and inferential material in addition to straight reporting. Hence the Mission report stressed that "a reputable news agency is only concerned with the reporting of *fully substantiated, well-sourced or eye-witnessed facts*, as well as *attributable conclusions or comment*, always endeavouring to balance the latter whenever they contain a controversial element."⁸⁵ CANA's purpose, the Mission asserted, would be to serve the interests of subscribers and of the region as a whole—a goal which it could achieve only by maintaining the highest standards of journalistic integrity and accuracy.

The majority of CPBA members were publicly owned and the mission wanted to avoid having government-related media provide the majority of CANA's revenue. Hence the Mission suggested that only CPBA members who were part of the block contract with Reuters should become owners of CANA, thus giving majority ownership to private media. To tip the balance still further, shares were allocated on a pro rata basis comparable to the contribution to Reuters. Others who wished to use the agency would be subscribers, not shareholders. This arrangement, in addition to the Heads of

Government 1972 agreement to remain out of the agency, largely allayed fears that CANA might not be politically independent.

At the annual general meeting of the CPBA in 1974, all participants in the block contract with Reuters except the Gleaner Company of Jamaica accepted the CANA Mission report in principle and referred it to their boards for final ratification. Tom Sherman, managing director of the Gleaner Company during this period, explained that his company "wasn't impressed with the thinking that the private media would retain control."⁸⁶

Agreement with Reuters

Reuters news agency appears to have played a somewhat mixed role in CANA's formation. In the opinion of John Gordon, a former Reuters correspondent who was part of the CANA Mission, Reuters expressed some opposition to CANA initially by requesting a very high fee for its world service. Gordon recommended that CANA take the AP service instead, and Reuters then found it possible to lower its fee.⁸⁷ In the view of the mission team coordinator, Hugh Cholmondeley, Reuters cooperated only after it recognized "that CANA was inevitably going to be established because there was no alternative plan for responding to the changed conditions," and that CANA was going to be an independent agency.⁸⁸ According to Shahe Guebenlian, who had been Reuters manager for the Caribbean during CANA's formative years, Reuters was anxious for an orderly turnover, and was concerned only that CANA should be a professional operation.⁸⁹

In early 1975 the potential owners of CANA submitted a proposal to Reuters to meet with CPBA and Unesco Mission officials in London in March and Reuters agreed. At that meeting a "Memorandum of Agreement between CPBA and Reuters" was signed.⁹⁰ As a result, Reuters and CANA began a joint service (Reuter-CANA) on July 7, 1975, for a six-month transitional period, with an Interim Board of Directors to run the agency, and with Reuters' Caribbean editor, Barbadian Harry Mayers, as editor. CANA used Reuters' staff and part-time correspondents as well as buildings and equipment in Barbados. During the transitional period, steps were taken to prepare for CANA's launching as an independent agency in early 1976. At the annual meeting of CPBA, CANA's potential shareholders approved the Articles of As-

sociation for the new agency and named Harry Mayers, the editor of Reuter-CANA, as general manager-designate.

THE CARIBBEAN NEWS AGENCY

Nine years of effort to form a regional news agency in the Caribbean culminated in the incorporation of CANA as an independent, non-profit, limited liability company on January 7, 1976. On that date CANA assumed responsibility for collecting, processing and distributing news to fifteen shareholders and five subscribers in seven Caribbean countries.

The rationale for CANA's formation, as stated by its shareholders, was "the need for a greater flow of information between the countries . . . of the Region and between the Region and the rest of the world. . . ."91 The main objective of CANA was to provide "an efficient and independent News Service"92 by offering "a fair, comprehensive, accurate and impartial report on events and developments in the Caribbean and elsewhere . . . with special reference to public interest in the Caribbean. . . ."93

Ownership and Control

In order to form an independent, regional news agency jointly owned by private and public media, CANA's founders devised an unusual system of ownership and control for the agency. They were faced with the problem of finding a means of maintaining the agency's stated commitment to independence and objectivity,⁹⁴ while at the same time allowing publicly owned Caribbean media to be among the shareholders and subscribers. Only about half of the Caribbean mass media were privately owned, and they could hardly have supported a news agency without the cooperation of government-related media. The problem was to set up an institution with publicly owned media as participants which could not control its output.⁹⁵

Governments themselves could not own shares in CANA nor appoint members to the Board of Directors.⁹⁶ Only media who were members of the CPBA and had been part of the contract with Reuters in 1974, or their successors, were eligible to become shareholders.⁹⁷ At the time of CANA's formation, private media held 54% of the shares while the public media (mainly public corpor-

ations) held 46%. The fact that the public media came from several different nations representing varying ideological positions made any combined political manipulation by governments unlikely.

CANA's legal documents contained provisions to ensure that the Board of Directors did not control the agency's editorial policy. The *Articles of Association* provided for a distinct division of responsibilities between the general manager and the board. The board was to appoint a general manager and manage all business not reserved for a general meeting.⁹⁸ The day-to-day operation and control of the company's work was the responsibility of the general manager, who was to function as a media professional. He was solely responsible for the gathering, selection and presentation of news as well as for CANA's editorial policy. The company undertook "to refrain from interfering in any manner whatsoever with the duties and responsibilities of the General Manager."⁹⁹ However, the general manager undertook to examine on merit any specific aspect of CANA's reporting activities which the company regarded as inadequate or inaccurate and "to take at his discretion such remedial action as may be deemed necessary."¹⁰⁰ Thus, the media representatives who constituted the Board of Directors had no direct voice in the news output of the agency. This separation of the editorial functioning of the agency from its direction protected its editorial independence.

Additional protection for CANA's news file was provided by the fact that shareholders were to appoint three trustees who could be appealed to as "an independent and prestigious forum for the consideration of any grievances, . . . alleged failure or refusal by the company to provide an accurate, unbiased or independent news service. . . ."¹⁰¹ All shareholders were asked to sign a Deed of Trust undertaking "to use their best endeavours to ensure —"

a) that CANA shall at no time pass into the hands of any one interest group or faction;

b) that its integrity, independence and freedom from bias shall at all times be fully preserved and that it will operate in accordance with the highest traditions of well researched and objective reporting;

c) that its business shall be so administered that it shall supply an unbiased and reliable news service to subscribers. . . .¹⁰²

The issue of government control was thus not one of censorship but of possible political pressure. And, as Hugh Cholmondeley

pointed out, political pressure is a fact of life in every country and it is the duty of the general manager to cope with it on a daily basis.¹⁰³ In embracing ownership by government media, CANA modified the pattern of private ownership of news agencies which characterized the western world; however, CANA attempted to do so in a manner which would minimize the influence of governments on the agency.

The potential for influence on CANA by a particular government remained in one other area. Since CANA was incorporated as a Barbadian company, it was subject to the work permit requirements of Barbados. If the government wished, it could withhold work permits, thus influencing CANA's choice of personnel.

Unlike other similar regional agencies,¹⁰⁴ CANA was entirely owned by regional media and was therefore independent of both financial support and editorial control from foreign news agencies, including Reuters, whose Caribbean Service CANA largely took over.

Subscribers and Staff

Any organization which wished to receive the CANA service but had not been part of the CPBA agreement with Reuters was eligible to become a subscriber rather than a shareholder. CANA began with five regular subscribers and, in addition, the Gleaner Company subscribed on a temporary, month-by-month basis.¹⁰⁵ Blunt opposition to CANA was expressed by Theodore Sealey, who had been editor-in-chief of the *Gleaner* during CANA's formative years:

I was opposed to it at all stages and took no part in it. As editor I never attended meetings on the subject. . . . My position was that I didn't see why Unesco wanted to spend money to deprive the Caribbean press of its freedom. This would be the case because Unesco could only work through governments and government media.¹⁰⁶

According to the Unesco representative in the Caribbean, this perception of how Unesco functions is "simply not the case."¹⁰⁷ Once a request is presented to the United Nations by governments, the UN agencies can relate directly to any institution relevant to the request.

Both shareholders and subscribers signed formal contracts with CANA agreeing to pay an annual subscription fee. The cost of the service for print media clients was computed on the basis of the cir-

culuation size of the subscribing organization. For electronic media, cost was based on audience size and the number of television and radio sets in the country. The cost of transmission varied according to the distance from the Barbados distribution center, the number of clients in a particular territory, and the routing of the telecommunications circuits used.¹⁰⁸

CANA began its service with nine staffers in the Barbados headquarters and twenty-four stringers, two in each of twelve Caribbean countries. In terms of top personnel, CANA was somewhat more indigenous and more regional than its predecessor. Whereas Reuters Caribbean Service was headed by an English general manager, CANA's general manager was a Caribbean citizen. CANA's first general manager, Barbadian Harry Mayers, who had edited the Reuters Caribbean Service, had received two years of in-service training at Reuters' head office in London, and prior to that had worked in a variety of capacities for two Barbadian newspapers. At CANA's opening ceremony the chairman of CANA's Board of Directors observed that it was fortunate to have in Mayers a man of "impeccable professionalism and integrity."¹⁰⁹

While the staff of Reuters Caribbean other than the general manager was entirely Barbadian, by mid-1977 CANA had placed an experienced Guyanese journalist in the post of chief editor and thus second-in-command. The chief editor was responsible to the general manager for the overall functions of the agency's editorial report. Actual changes in personnel were not extensive, however; junior posts were occupied by the same Barbadian staff and CANA started with the stringers Reuters had put in place.

News Sources, Channels, Messages and Receivers

The nature and volume of news flow both within the Caribbean and between the Caribbean and the rest of the world were modified somewhat by CANA's genesis.

To improve news flow among nations in the Caribbean region, CANA aimed to sell to more clients, increase the quantity of news, change the focus, and add to the variety of topics covered. CANA had 20 clients when it began, five more than Reuters had served. Regional news for CANA, as for Reuters Caribbean Service, came from full-time staff in Barbados and stringers in twelve other islands, as well as from monitoring local mass media; however, by

the end of its first year, CANA was transmitting about 6,000 words of Caribbean news a day, almost twice as much as Reuters had provided. In addition, CANA's Guidebook instructed stringers to use a Caribbean perspective in their news writing. CANA broadened the variety of stories available to clients by using news of the wider Caribbean area provided by Prensa Latina of Cuba, and by transmitting more background and feature stories.

CANA would have preferred to place its own correspondents in important foreign capitals, but could not afford to do so. For news from outside the Caribbean, therefore, CANA depended almost entirely on Reuters 24-hour World Service. CANA's shareholders had exclusive rights to reception and distribution of Reuters service in the Caribbean, although any subscriber could ask to receive the whole Reuters service rather than just the stories selected by CANA for redistribution.¹¹⁰ CANA's objective in relation to foreign news was to "offer a comprehensive, reliable and impartial report . . . with special reference to public interest in the Caribbean."¹¹¹ In attempting to achieve this objective, CANA's staff modified the news received from Reuters in three ways: a) In drawing upon Reuters world news file, the staff used a "Caribbean perspective," described by the agency's Guidebook as "one of the major reasons CANA was created;"¹¹² b) whenever relevant, CANA asked Reuters for special coverage targeted to the Caribbean in relation in foreign stories; c) since the Caribbean area was particularly interested in third world news, CANA used occasional stories from other sources, mainly Prensa Latina, which had correspondents in many areas of the developing world.

CANA's emergence affected the volume and variety of news potentially available to the rest of the world through Reuters World Service. In terms of quantity, Reuters Caribbean Service had selected only one hour of regional news for transmission to London, but CANA transmitted its entire and larger news file, thus making available a much larger number of Caribbean stories from which Reuters could select. In terms of content, CANA staffers provided more background and feature stories than Reuters Caribbean had done, and news of the Caribbean was shaped by the effort of CANA staff to write from a Caribbean perspective.

Reuters' London office, as well as CANA correspondents in Jamaica, Trinidad and Tobago, and Guyana, had direct communi-

cations with CANA by leased duplex telegraph circuits which linked headquarters to teletype machines at the respective centers. These circuits operated for 24 hours a day, enabling the correspondents to file news directly at any time. News from these sources came into the CANA office on tapes with a printed version on telex monitors. Stringers in the other Caribbean territories filed urgent and important news by Cable and Wireless telex facilities; consequently, there were some delays in processing and transmitting copy. Telephone was used on rare occasions for very urgent stories. Stringers also maintained a file of secondary news developments and this was airmailed to CANA. The offices of all subscribers were equipped with teleprinter machines to which CANA sent news via leased duplex circuits. CANA transmitted news for 16 hours a day, though its circuitry had the capacity for 24-hour transmission.

CANA's news messages comprised a file of 20,000 words a day, approximately 14-15,000 words of international news from Reuters and 5-6,000 words of Caribbean news. Stories selected from the Reuters file were not edited but sent out as received, although requests might be made to Reuters for more information on subjects with particular Caribbean relevance. All Caribbean copy was edited. The vast bulk of CANA's news file consisted of hard news. In addition, CANA carried a few editorials and features from Caribbean newspapers, and CANA staff also produced some features.

None of the special services in areas such as bauxite, agriculture or tourism recommended by CANA's feasibility studies were operational when CANA started, because of the lack of time and personnel to complete marketing arrangements. However, CANA headquarters maintained special files on these subjects so that background information for news stories and features would be readily available.

In May, 1976, four months after CANA's birth, General Manager Harry Mayers observed that a gradual reorientation had been taking place in the news being made available to the Caribbean. Whereas Reuters had written Caribbean stories for both the Caribbean and overseas audience simultaneously, he said, CANA was writing stories "primarily for the Caribbean audience, from a Caribbean perspective."¹³

In 1976 CANA's only non-Caribbean news receiver was Reuters of London. Within the region, however, CANA had twenty clients

in seven English-speaking countries. The fifteen clients who were shareholders came from five countries—Barbados, Guyana, Jamaica, Trinidad and Tobago, and Montserrat. Among the five subscribers were media from some of the above territories as well as from Antigua and St. Lucia. CANA's clientele represented a variety of categories, both in ownership and type of medium. Six of the fifteen shareholders were publicly owned media. These included five radio and television stations owned by Caribbean governments, and one radio station, Radio Antilles, owned by national German interests. The remaining shareholders, nine privately owned media, included five newspapers and four radio stations. Three of these radio stations were in foreign hands, being owned by the Rediffusion Group of England. Among the subscribers, two were publicly owned and three were privately owned.

Internal Operations and Policies

Most of CANA's operational and policy guidelines were published in a guidebook prepared during the first year of CANA's operation. An American and former AP journalist provided by Unesco to advise CANA for a year, David Pellegrin, assisted in the preparation of the guidebook, which was based heavily upon guidelines from Reuters, AP, the *New York Times* and the American Newspaper Publishers Association. In the Foreword, CANA's general manager summarized his view of the role of the guidebook:

Nowadays the question of the role of the media is exercising the minds of people in developed as well as developing countries like ours. Implicit in the question sometimes is the idea that media organizations should alter their externally influenced perspectives. Changing of perspectives? Yes. Propaganda? NO. This guidebook should be an invaluable tool in helping journalists differentiate between the two.¹¹⁴

The guidebook contained chapters on CANA policies, reporting, writing, editing, broadcast news, style specifics, libel and filing practices. It asked the staff to "make every effort—on the same story—to present all sides of any dispute" and pointed out that although the main office was in Barbados, CANA was not the voice of Barbados or any other country.

The senior editorial officer on duty was responsible for reading all incoming copy before any rewriting or subbing was done and for assigning stories to staffers with clear directions on how they should be treated. The stories would then be referred back to the senior of-

ficer for clearance before punching and transmission.¹¹⁵ Since about half of CANA's subscribers were broadcast media, CANA was to provide news summaries in broadcast style.

The book asked staff to look for interesting features and news-focus pieces, explaining that they "should try continuously to examine complex but important subjects—such as economic development policies—so that the reader can understand them and see how he might be affected." Writers were to look for the "local angle" on both Caribbean and worldwide news stories, but "objectivity is still essential" and editorializing "is definitely out of the question." To illustrate a "Caribbean perspective," the guidebook used the example of a Reuters story on a third world economic conference. CANA writers should stress the participation of Caribbean representatives, it said, and CANA editors should ask Reuters for special coverage when needed.

Three Years Later

With the advent of CANA, the Caribbean had, for the first time, a regionally owned news agency with the goal of a Caribbean news perspective, an entirely Caribbean staff, more Caribbean subscribers and a larger Caribbean news file than had Reuters. CANA was in a position to begin to fulfill the expectations of its founders for an increasing flow of information both within the region and between the region and the rest of the world. However, three years later, certain issues which could affect the agency's potential for fulfilling such expectations had begun to crystallize, some of which have implications for other attempts to develop regional news agencies.

Economic Issues. Critical economic issues were lack of finance for expansion and the increasing cost of telecommunications.

One of the major fears during CANA's formative years was that the agency would not be financially viable. At the end of its first year, CANA was able to declare a small profit of \$1,500 U.S. During its second year, however, the agency had a loss of \$16,000, over 60% of which was due to a bad debt by one of the shareholders.¹¹⁶ For its third year of operation CANA's profit was \$12,000, and, in the fourth year, \$10,000.

By 1980 CANA's expansion included increasing staff at headquarters from nine to fourteen, replacing stringers with full-time

correspondents in four of the largest countries (Jamaica, Antigua, Trinidad & Tobago, and Guyana), acquiring fourteen new subscribers, including three from New York,¹¹⁷ and having the *Gleaner* become a shareholder. CANA's radio service was improved by the addition of two daily radio bulletins. CANA's news volume increased from 6,000 to 10-15,000 words of Caribbean news a day and 15-20,000 words of international news, and staff members were writing more features and using a more Caribbean perspective.

On the other hand CANA had not been able to start a feature service or to broaden its news service because of lack of funds.¹¹⁸ Projected special services such as agriculture, bauxite and tourism were not in operation, and, although there was potentially a much larger market for the regular news service, CANA could not expand as much as it would have liked because the agency had no funds for marketing personnel and because telecommunications costs made expansion very expensive.

CANA's general manager regarded telecommunications costs as a serious impediment to CANA's expansion.¹¹⁹ The managing director of the Gleaner Company estimated that, because the Caribbean had no special press rate, about four-fifths of the total costs for news gathering and transmission in the 1970s went for transmission costs. In his opinion, "if we are interested in improving news flow, it is absolutely ridiculous to be paying that proportion just for the physical movement of the news."¹²⁰ Reuters' chief correspondent for the wider Caribbean provided a striking illustration.¹²¹ It was cheaper to file news from the French Island of Martinique to Paris than to nearby Barbados, because the French have a special press rate.

The first call for action on the issue came in 1979. Addressing the Inter American Press Association (IAPA), Harry Mayers asked the association to study international telecommunications systems with a view to helping CANA obtain cheaper rates to "aid the flow of information among developing countries."¹²² Even though CANA's operation was restricted to the English-speaking area, he believed CANA had a role to play in promoting the exchange of news with the non-English-speaking Caribbean. It could surmount the linguistic hurdles, but the hurdles of communication cost were prohibitive. In response, the IAPA board approved a resolution noting that international communication carriers sometimes hindered the

free flow of news through seemingly illogical price structures and organization, and asking the IAPA president to open discussions with the carriers in the hemisphere with the aim of achieving cost reductions.¹²³

Political Issues. Contrary to earlier fears, CANA's board chairman, Ken Gordon, reported at the end of the first year that there had been "no attempt on the part of any government or any affiliated media to interfere in the operations of the News Agency."¹²⁴ At the end of the second year, Gordon reported: "We have adhered to our commitment to function on totally independent lines." He acknowledged that the agency had received occasional criticisms but accepted that as "part of the price one pays for doing one's job independently and fearlessly."¹²⁵ In 1979 CANA's general manager stated that "the governments have put no pressure on CANA up to now, though I think there is some smouldering resentment that CANA hasn't put out reports that always favour governments."¹²⁶

Terry Williams, Reuters' Caribbean correspondent, agreed that CANA was "maintaining its independence,"¹²⁷ and Shahe Guebenlian, Reuters' former Caribbean manager said, "We did not see that Reuters' integrity and independence was impugned in any way with the change to CANA."¹²⁸ The managing director of the Gleaner Company stated in 1979: "Up to this time CANA has been quite successful in keeping away from the position of being a public relations agency for governments, . . . has withstood pressure from governments . . . and political bias has been, by and large, avoided."¹²⁹

The Gleaner Company had in 1977 changed from a monthly subscriber to a shareholder. The retiring editor, Theodore Sealey, said in 1979 that he disagreed with the change, and Tom Sherman, the former managing director, said that he "would not have compromised."¹³⁰ But the new editor, Hector Wynter, explained that "what helped push the Gleaner into CANA was sheer foreign exchange necessity."¹³¹ Oliver Clarke, the incoming managing director, agreed that the decision was mainly economic, but, by then, "CANA had a certain proven track record."¹³²

The Gleaner Company became the largest holder of CANA's shares (10.5%) and its membership in CANA increased the proportion of private shareholding. However, by 1979 three privately owned shareholders became either government-owned or owned by

employees and community organizations.¹³⁵ Two of these retained their shares but a third, the Jamaica *Daily News*, did not. Thus, in 1979 CANA's shareholders comprised eight publicly owned and seven privately owned media, although there was little change in the balance between private and public shareholders. Though the voting strength of publicly owned media on CANA's Board of Directors had increased, the diversity of governments in widely scattered, autonomous countries assured that no single government could exert much influence on CANA. Even if a government pressured its media to cancel contracts with CANA, such pressure would not endanger the agency. Hugh Cholmondeley observed that "you can't talk about the concept of control without talking about how that control would be exercised, and once you talk about that, you realize that Guyana cannot exercise control on CANA in Barbados, and so on."¹³⁴

The *Gleaner's* managing director, Oliver Clarke, regarded ownership percentages as of secondary importance and suggested that the personnel involved were more critical. "If governments intimidate the local representatives of CANA, or if they are appointed to appease administrations, then, in effect, out of that country you have a flow of garbage."¹³⁵

The necessity of obtaining work permits from the Barbados government for non-Barbadian staff at CANA headquarters remained an area of possible political influence. CANA was not a regional organization in the sense of the University of the West Indies or the Caribbean Development Bank, which were supported by governments and thus exempted from work permit requirements. As a company registered in Barbados, CANA was subject to its laws. CANA's staff remained entirely Barbadian until mid-1977, when a Guyanese chief editor was hired. The general manager said he did not expect work permits to be granted to anyone below the level of chief editor, which could mean that CANA's staff would remain largely Barbadian and that CANA probably could not even bring its other correspondents and stringers to Barbados for a brief work experience. The CPBA urged the Caribbean Secretariat to ask the Heads of Government to permit interchangeability of journalists between the islands without the barrier of work permits.¹³⁶ Three years later the Heads of Government had not met to consider its request.

The work permit issue raises interesting and important questions for regional news agencies. Work permit laws are used in most countries to protect the jobs of nationals. CANA was expected to perform a regional function, yet was not recognized as a regional institution. Nationalism thus has the potential of working against regionalism in the area of news and information flow, an area often considered critical to regional development. How Caribbean leaders resolve the issue would be instructive to other regional news agencies.

Ideological Issues. Operating within the parameters of western traditions of objectivity and professionalism,¹³⁷ three years after its birth CANA did not fit the pattern found in many third world countries of being used mainly for governmental development purposes. In the 1970s when Guyana came out in favor of increased government control of the media, government personnel made statements which suggested that traditional concepts of objectivity and professionalism were part of the colonial apparatus which a developing nation could not afford, and that a developing country could not "leave matters such as ownership and media content to chance."¹³⁸ It was impossible to predict whether or not some other nations in the region might reach the same conclusion.

However, the fact that CANA was a regional agency serving clients in countries with different ideological orientations gave it considerable insulation against pressure from any particular nation. To maintain such a varied clientele, in fact, CANA's news reports would have to be as objective as possible.

While there was no evidence in 1979 that CANA's commitment to objectivity and professionalism was being questioned by its owners and subscribers, some observers felt that CANA was not providing a sufficiently Caribbean perspective. For example, the editor of Jamaica's *Daily News* accused CANA of a "metropolitan approach," and attributed this to its historical association with Reuters,¹³⁹ suggesting that CANA still depended on a British point of view. Lack of a Caribbean perspective was perhaps unavoidable in the initial stages, because CANA did not start in a vacuum but grew out of the western news agency tradition and employed journalists trained to write for Reuters. However, many of CANA's clients believed that the agency was already providing an increasingly Caribbean perspective,¹⁴⁰ and it was likely that trend would continue.

CANA's general manager, Harry Mayers, addressing a conference in Stockholm in 1978, termed perspective the fundamental news problem for the third world. Consciously or unconsciously, he said, news from developed world news agencies exhibited the views and biases of the metropolitan powers. He added that the third world's call for re-examination of news channels and messages should not automatically be equated with attempts to curtail freedom of the press, and pointed to CANA as an example of an independent third world news agency run by professional journalists.¹⁴¹

Conclusions

CANA marks the advent of an independent third world news agency which overcomes the characteristic third world dependence on governments while accommodating public and private media alike. Unlike some other regional agencies in the third world, CANA is also independent of foreign news agencies, financially, editorially and managerially. Several conclusions are suggested:

- 1) When government owns media, the formation of a regional rather than a national news agency can make independence from governments possible because public ownership based in several different countries minimizes the danger that any single government can exert a decisive political influence.

- 2) In third world regions with limited resources, the cooperation of institutions both internal and external to the region is likely to be necessary if a news agency is to succeed. In the case of Caribbean media, Unesco funding and personnel for feasibility studies was critical, as was Reuters' willingness to make its Caribbean technological facilities available. That regional governments gave the mass media a free hand in forming a news agency greatly facilitated the undertaking.

- 3) To carry out a truly regional operation, regional news agencies must be treated as regional rather than national organizations in order to be exempt from work permit requirements. The needed cooperation among national governments may not be easily forthcoming. The danger is that the country in which the agency is incorporated can limit the agency's choice of personnel and thus its news function.

- 4) A news agency in a geographically scattered region requires extensive telecommunications facilities. Where commercial tele-

communications rates are very high, special press rates may be needed.

5) The third world can move to provide a more indigenous news perspective without interfering with press freedom. CANA provides the model of an agency which writes news from the regional angle and targets external news to the needs and interests of the region, while maintaining a commitment to objectivity and professionalism.

NOTES

1. "Index of News Agencies" in Unesco, *World Communications: A 200-Country Survey of Press, Radio, Television and Film* (New York: Unipub, 1975). Of approximately 230 agencies listed in this index, the vast majority began after World War II.

2. The five agencies—Associated Press and United Press International of the United States, Reuters of England, Agence France-Presse, and TASS of the USSR—were identified as the major world or international agencies by Unesco (*ibid.*, p. 9), by John C. Merrill, Carter R. Bryan and Marvin Alisky in *The Foreign Press* (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1964), p. 34, and by journalism researcher Al Hester, who defined a world news agency as one that "spans the globe with its services and has the capability to cover events in all major areas and . . . has clients, members, or subscribers throughout the globe." See "International News Agencies," in Alan Wells, ed., *Mass Communications: A World View* (Palo Alto, California: Mayfield Publishing Company, 1974), pp. 208-9.

3. Evidence of this debate is found in reports of various conferences on the subject. See, for example, *Development Dialogue 2* (1976) for a report of a seminar on The Role of Information in the New International Order, Mexico City, May 24-28, 1976, sponsored by the Latin American Institute for Transnational Studies with the Dag Hammarskjold Foundation; Ministerial Conference of Non-aligned Countries on the Press Agencies Pool, New Delhi, July 8-13, 1976, "The Pool of News Agencies of Non-aligned Countries," A/P/3/Rev 11, July 13, 1976; Philip C. Horton, ed., *The Third World and Press Freedom* (New York: Praeger, 1978), the report of a conference sponsored by the Edward R. Murrow Center of the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, Tufts University, New York, May, 1977; UNESCO, "Intergovernmental Conference on Communication Policies in Latin America and the Caribbean," San José, Costa Rica, July 12-21, 1976 (Paris: UNESCO, 1976). Com/Md./38.

4. In Asia, Africa and the Arab World, regional organizations were formed by news agencies which were primarily government-owned. An Organization of Asian News Agencies was founded in 1961, and a Union of African News Agencies was established in 1963 but did not survive its first ten years (Unesco, *World Communi-*

cations, *op. cit.*, pp. 11, 13). In 1975 the national news agencies of the Arab world formed a Union of Arab News Agencies (Mohamed Abdel Gawad, "Attempts of the Arab World to Participate in Balancing the Flow of Information," in Horton, *op. cit.*, p. 177.) In Latin America, two regional news agencies were formed by private media (John Spicer Nichols, "LATIN—Latin American Regional News Agency," *Gazette* XXI: 170-81 (1975); Guido Fernandez, "ACAN: A Solution to the Problem of News Flow in the Third World," Horton, pp. 151-55). A Third World News Pool was established in 1976 to facilitate exchange of news among its membership. See Pero Ivacic, "The Non-Aligned Countries Pool Their News," *Unesco Courier* (April 1977), pp. 25-27.

5. The terms Commonwealth Caribbean, West Indies and English-speaking Caribbean are used interchangeably to refer to seventeen territories with a population of less than five million which are associated with the British Commonwealth. For the purpose of this study the term "Caribbean," when used alone, also refers to this area while "wider Caribbean" is inclusive of other territories of Spanish, French and Dutch background.

6. Unesco, *World Communications*, 9-13.

7. LATIN, formed in South America in 1971, was heavily dependent on Reuters managerially and editorially (Nichols, *op. cit.*; Mort Rosenblum, "Western Wire Services and Third World News Agencies," paper presented to the conference on The Third World and Press Freedom (*Supra*, N.3, p.3). By 1978, in fact, LATIN was nearly bankrupt and the LATIN and Reuters operations were integrated, though they remained separate legal entities (Terry Williams, Reuters Chief Correspondent, Caribbean, discussing a 1978 Reuters Internal Memo to Staff with the author, Wildey, Barbados, Jan. 12, 1979). A Central American news agency begun in 1973, ACAN had one-third of its shares owned by the Spanish news agency, EFE, which also appointed its General Manager (Fernandez, *op. cit.*, p. 177).

8. Marlene Cuthbert, "Reaction to International News Agencies: 1930s and 1970s Compared," *Gazette* XXVI:2 (1980); Al Hester, "The Western News Agencies: Problems and Opportunities in International News," paper presented to the seminar on The Role of Information in the New International Order, *supra*, N.2, p. 26; Wilbur Schramm, *Mass Media and National Development* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1964), p. 261.

9. See, e.g., Marlene Cuthbert, "Canadian Newspaper Treatment of a Developing Country," *Canadian Journal of Communication* 7:1 (Summer 1980); Marlene Cuthbert, "News Selection and News Values: Jamaica in the Foreign Press," *Caribbean Studies* 19:2 (July 1979): 93-109; Marlene Cuthbert and Verdone Sparkes, "Coverage of Jamaica in the U.S. and Canadian Press in 1976: A Study of Press Bias and Effect," *Social and Economic Studies* 27:204-20 (June 1978); Jim A. Hart, "The Flow of International News into Ohio," *Journalism Quarterly* 38:541-43 (Autumn 1961); Al Hester, "An Analysis of News Flow from Developed and Developing Nations," *Gazette* 17:29-43 (1971); James Markham, "Foreign News in the United States and South American Press," *Public Opinion Quarterly* 25:249-62 (Summer 1961); Andrew K. Semmel, "Foreign News in Four U.S. Elite Dailies: Some Comparisons," *Journalism Quarterly* 53:734-6 (Winter 1976).

10. A British political scientist described dependency as a "relationship between nations characterized by an asymmetry in distribution and control of power and resources." See Phil Harris, "International News Media Authority and Dependence," *Politics* 9:149 (November 1974). See also Hester, "The Western News Agencies," *op. cit.* and editor's introduction to "Forms of Cultural Dependency: A Symposium," *Journal of Communication* 25:121 (Spring 1975) in which the editor states that cultural dependencies are "primarily communicational" in origin. Another symposium on the subject is found in Vol. 24 (Winter 1974) of the same journal.

11. Don Dodson and William A. Hachten, "Communication and Development: African and Afro-American Parallels," *Journalism Monographs* No. 28:13 (May 1973). This type of dependency was illustrated by Phil Harris in relation to Reuters' wire service to West Africa ("International News Media and Underdevelopment," unpublished M. Phil. thesis, University of Leicester, 1975).

12. "Development of News Exchange in Latin America," in Report of Unesco Meeting of Experts on the Development of News Exchange in Latin America, Quito, 1975, Annex V (Paris: UNESCO, COM-75/CONF.603/4, 1975), pp. 2, 8-9.

13. This point was made by John Lent in "Commonwealth Caribbean Mass Media: Historical, Cultural, Economic and Political Aspects," unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of Iowa, 1972, p. 234 and by William Demas in *West Indian Nationhood and Caribbean Integration* (Barbados, W.I.: CCC Publishing House, 1974), p. 29.

14. "Foreign News Gatekeepers and Criteria of Newsworthiness," *Journalism Quarterly* 56:25 (Spring 1979).

15. *Mass Media and National Development* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1964), p. 261.

16. Philip Sherlock, *West Indies* (New York: Walker and Company, 1966), pp. 12-14; Robert D. Crassweller, *The Caribbean Community: Changing Societies and U.S. Policy* (New York: Praeger, 1972), pp. 310, 427; M.G. Smith, *The Plural Society in the British West Indies* (Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1965), pp. 5, 14.

17. Eric Williams, *Capitalism and Slavery* (London: Andre Deutsch, 1964), pp. 51-2.

18. D.A. G. Waddell, *The West Indies and the Guianas* (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1967), p. 130.

19. Guy M. Roppa and Neville E. Clarke, "The Commonwealth Caribbean: Regional Cooperation in News and Broadcasting Exchanges," report of a survey mission, November-December 1968 (Paris: UNESCO, 1969), Serial No. 1185/BMS.RD/MC, p. 6.

20. Hugh N.J. Cholmondeley, "The Establishment and Role of a Caribbean News Agency," in International Broadcast Institute, *Communications and Information for Development Purposes in the Caribbean Area*, report of a conference in Georgetown, Guyana, Dec. 1-8, 1974 (London: International Broadcast Institute, 1975), p. 63.

21. Sherlock, *op. cit.*, p. 89.

22. Nine Commonwealth Caribbean territories were independent by 1980 — the Bahamas, Barbados, Dominica, Grenada, Guyana, Jamaica, St. Lucia, St. Vincent, and Trinidad and Tobago. Four others, Antigua, Belize and St. Kitts-Nevis, were Associated States of Britain, an arrangement in which they had internal self-government but Britain was responsible for defense and foreign affairs. See J.H. Parry and P.M. Sherlock, *A Short History of the West Indies* (London: Macmillan, 1971), p. 300. Colonies in the British Caribbean in 1979 were Anguilla, British Virgin Islands, Cayman Islands, Montserrat and the Turks and Caicos Islands.

23. Amitai Etzioni, *Political Unification: A Comparative Study of Leaders and Forces* (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1965), pp. 146, 166-70; David Lowenthal, *West Indian Societies* (London: Oxford University Press, 1972).

24. Demas, *op. cit.*, passim; Everold Hosein, "An Exploratory Study of the Significance and Feasibility of a Regional Television Programming System for the Commonwealth Caribbean," unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of Michigan, 1973; Lent, *op. cit.*, pp. 211, 423.

25. Philip Sherlock, *West Indian Nations: A New History* (Kingston: Jamaica Publishing House Limited and London: Macmillan, 1973), p. 297.

26. Eric Williams, *From Columbus to Castro: The History of the Caribbean 1492-1969* (London: Andre Deutsch, 1970), p. 501.

27. See, for example, Robert Crassweller, *op. cit.*, p. 311; William Demas, *op. cit.*, pp. 4, 18; G.K. Lewis, *The Growth of the Modern West Indies* (London: McGibbon and Kee, 1968), p. 389; Williams, *ibid.*, pp. 500-1.

28. Hon. S.S. Ramphal, "The Search for Caribbean Identity," in *Called To Be*, Report of the Caribbean Ecumenical Consultation for Development (Bridgetown, Barbados: CADEC, 1972), p. 26.

29. Commonwealth Caribbean Regional Secretariat, *CARIFTA and the New Caribbean* (Georgetown, Guyana: Regional Secretariat, 1971); Crassweller, *op. cit.*, p. 211.

30. *Essays on Caribbean Integration and Development* (University of the West Indies, Jamaica: Institute of Social and Economic Research, 1976), p. 117.

31. *Ibid.*, pp. 139-41, 146.

32. *Ibid.*, p. 146 and *West Indian Nationhood*, p. 72.

33. *From Columbus to Castro*, *op. cit.*, p. 502.

34. Rosina Wiltshire, "Regional Integration and Conflict in the Commonwealth Caribbean," unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of Michigan, 1973, p. 23.

35. Vaughan A. Lewis, "Concept and Analysis in the Study of Third World Regional Integration," *Social and Economic Studies* 26:3 (March 1977).

36. *West Indian Nationhood*, pp. 4, 8; *Change and Renewal in the Caribbean* (Barbados: CCC Publishing House, 1975), passim.

37. Parry and Sherlock, *op. cit.*, p. 300; *Change and Renewal*, p. 58; Williams, *From Columbus to Castro*, p. 502.

38. Recommendation of the Seventh Heads of Government Conference as summarized by the Secretary General of the Commonwealth Caribbean Regional Secretariat, William Demas, in *Caribbean Contact* (December 1972), p. 19.

39. See, for example, *Called To Be*, *op. cit.*, p. 12; Demas, *passim*; Williams, *From Columbus to Castro*, p. 502.

40. Crassweller, 201; Demas, *Change and Renewal*, 54-8; G.K. Lewis, *op. cit.*, p. 391; interview with Dr. Rosina Wiltshire, Department of Political Science, University of the West Indies, April 5, 1978.

41. Marlene Cuthbert, "Communication and Language," in Marlene Cuthbert, ed., *Language and Communication* (Bridgetown, Barbados: Cedar Press, 1976), p. 9; Robert B. LePage, "Problems to be Faced in the Use of English as the Medium of Education in Four West Indian Territories," in Joshua A. Fishman, Charles A. Ferguson and Jyotirindra Das Gupta, eds., *Language Problems of Developing Nations* (New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1968).

42. These concerns are expressed in publications such as *Called To Be*, *op. cit.*; Idris Hamid, ed., *Troubling of the Waters* (Box 92, San Fernando, Trinidad, 1973); David I. Mitchell, ed., *With Eyes Wide Open* (Bridgetown, Barbados: CADEC, 1973).

43. Anon., *Christian Action for Development in the Caribbean* (Bridgetown, Barbados: CADEC, 1975); Robert Cuthbert, "Development and the Caribbean Christian," in David I. Mitchell, *op. cit.*, p. 115; *Called To Be*, *op. cit.*, p. 14.

44. G.K. Lewis, *op. cit.*, p. 390; Demas, *Change and Renewal*, p. 58; Ramphal, "The Search for Caribbean Identity," *op. cit.*, p. 36.

45. *Op. cit.*, pp. 423, 432-4.

46. *CARIFTA and the New Caribbean*, 63.

47. *Essays and West Indian Nationhood*, *passim*.

48. Marlene Cuthbert, ed., *Caribbean Women in Communication for Development*, Report of workshop sponsored by Institute of Mass Communication, UWI (Barbados, W.I.: Cedar Press, 1975), p. 20.

49. Caribbean Workshop in Communications and Development, *What is Communication for Development?* Report of workshop held in Georgetown, Guyana, Dec. 3-8, 1972, sponsored by Unesco (Georgetown, UNDP, 1973), p. 6.

50. Guy M. Roppa and Neville E. Clarke, *op. cit.*, pp. 10-11, 21, state that in 1968 the region had 15 daily newspapers but the bulk of the circulation—298,000 out of 325,000 copies—was shared by the seven big dailies. Foreign ownership, by 1979, had decreased: only one large daily remained Thomson-owned and two radio stations were still owned by Rediffusion.

51. Harold Hoyte, "Who Should Own the Region's Press?" *Caribbean Contact* (December 1974), p. 17.

52. Roppa and Clarke, 42.

53. Interview with the author, Kingston, Jamaica, March 6, 1979.

54. Caribbean Workshop in Communications and Development, *op. cit.*, p. 8; International Broadcast Institute, *Communications and Information for Development Purposes in the Caribbean Area*, *op. cit.*, pp. 9-10.

55. Fourth Heads of Government Conference of the Commonwealth Caribbean, Bridgetown, Barbados, October 1967, "Resolution on the Need for Exchange of News and Radio and T.V. Programmes Within the Commonwealth Caribbean" (Georgetown, Guyana: Caribbean Community Secretariat). Appendix VII of unpublished report.

56. Roppa and Clarke survey. The discussion below, unless otherwise indicated, is based on this survey.

57. J. de Cros Dich, "The Caribbean News Agency: Report on Ways and Means of Establishment of CANA," report prepared for UNDP/UNESCO Mass Communications Project in the Caribbean, 1973, p. 20. Unpublished.

58. For details see Roppa and Clarke, Appendices I and II.

59. Hugh Cholmondeley, "Communications for Regional Integration in the Caribbean," Terminal Report of Chief Technical Advisor (Unesco, Paris: January 24, 1977), p. 5 (Restricted); Cholmondeley, "CANA: An Independent News Agency Launched by the English-Speaking Caribbean Countries," *Unesco Courier* (April 1977), pp. 10-11.

60. Roppa and Clarke, 79-80. A newspaper editor in Jamaica, J.C. Proute, made these points in an interview with the author, Nov. 20, 1977. An associate editor of the *Gleaner* and editor of the *Star*, Mr. Proute was a former editor of the *Jamaica Daily News* and an active member of CPBA and CANA's first Board of Directors.

61. Roppa and Clarke, 79-80.

62. Cholmondeley, "Communications for Regional Integration," 5.

63. Roppa and Clarke, 49.

64. Cholmondeley in de Cros Dich report *op. cit.*, p. 1. Cholmondeley was formerly head of the Guyana Broadcasting Service.

65. Rickey Singh, editor, writing in *Caribbean Contact* (August 1976), p. 16.

66. Hugh Cholmondeley, "CANA: How the Caribbeans Solved Their News-pooling Problem," *Media Asia*, 3:163 (1976).

67. Hugh Cholmondeley, "The Establishment and Role," 63, and "The History of Activities Leading to the Establishment of the Proposed Caribbean News Agency," unpublished report to Caribbean Media Administrators, Aug. 24, 1973, p. 2.

68. Hugh Cholmondeley and John C. Gordon, "Report of the CANA Mission" (Georgetown, Guyana: UNDP/UNESCO Mass Communications Project for the Caribbean, 1975), unpublished.

69. Cholmondeley, "Communications for Regional Integration," 7.

70. "The Proposed Caribbean News Agency," Unpublished report by Coordinator of Unesco Mass Communications Team, June 12, 1972, p. 7. This report is the source of information for this section unless otherwise indicated.

71. "The History of Activities," 4.

72. *Ibid.*, 5.

73. Cholmondeley, "The Establishment and Role," 65.

74. The meeting was held in April, 1973, in Castries, St. Lucia (Hugh Cholmondeley, "The Proposed Caribbean News Agency," 9).

75. *Daily Gleaner* (Jamaica), July 1, 1972.

76. Cholmondeley, "The Proposed Caribbean News Agency," 12.

77. De Cros Dich, *op. cit.*, 2.

78. Hugh Cholmondeley in Preface to de Cros Dich report, *ibid.*, p. 3.

79. *Op. cit.*, pp. 1, 5, 10, 15. Appendix I of the same report provides the detailed financial breakdown.

80. *Daily Gleaner*, July 19, 1974.
81. *Trinidad Express*, July 25, 1974.
82. J.C. Proute, untitled address to Lions Club, Kingston, Jamaica, January, 1974. Proute was also chairman of the Press Association of Jamaica and of the Freedom of the Press Committee of CPBA.
83. Cholmondeley and Gordon, 5.
84. *Ibid.* This report is the source of material in this section unless otherwise indicated.
85. *Ibid.*, Preface and p. 26.
86. Interview with the author, Kingston, Jamaica, Feb. 8, 1979.
87. Interview with author, London, England, June 28, 1977.
88. Interview with author, Kingston, Jamaica, April 22, 1978.
89. Interview with author, London, England, June 27, 1977.
90. London, March 26, 1975, unpublished.
91. Deed of Trust, Jan. 6, 1976, p. 1.
92. *Articles of Association*, Article 4.
93. *Memorandum of Association*, Article 3.
94. See *Memorandum and Articles of Association*; Subscription Contract, CANA; The Caribbean News Agency (CANA) Guidebook, prepared with assistance from David Pellegrin, Unesco Advisor (Bridgetown, Barbados, 1977).
95. Cholmondeley, interview with author, March 6, 1979.
96. See *Articles of Association* and Deed of Trust. Cf. another third world news agency, BERNAMA of Malaysia, in which the governing board has equal numbers of direct government appointees and media representatives (Cholmondeley, "The Proposed Caribbean News Agency," Appendix I). Other large third world news agencies such as MENA of Egypt and Prensa Latina of Cuba are completely owned by their respective states.
97. The shareholders were: Antilles Radio Corporation, Barbados Advocate News, Barbados Rediffusion, Caribbean Broadcasting Corporation (Barbados), *Chronicle* (Guyana), *Express* (Trinidad), Guyana Broadcasting Co., Guyana Broadcasting Service, Jamaica Broadcasting Corporation, National Broadcasting Service (Trinidad), Communications Corporation of Jamaica, Radio Jamaica Rediffusion, Radio Trinidad, Trinidad Publishing Co., Trinidad and Tobago TV.
98. The discussion in this section is based on the *Articles of Association*, Articles 37-93.
99. Subscription Contract, Clause 7.
100. *Ibid.*
101. *Articles of Association*, Article 94.
102. Deed of Trust, p. 3.
103. "The Establishment and Role," 66.
104. See footnote 7.
105. The original subscribers were: Government of Antigua, ZIZ Antigua, *The Voice* (St. Lucia), Radio St. Lucia and Radio Caribbean International (St. Lucia).
106. Telephone conversation with author, Jan. 3, 1979.
107. Hugh Cholmondeley, Unesco Regional Representative, interview with the author, March 6, 1979.

108. Unless otherwise indicated, sources for factual information in the rest of this report are personal interviews with Harry Mayers, General Manager, CANA, and Hubert Williams, Chief Editor, CANA, Wildey, Barbados, Jan. 11-23, 1979.

109. Ken Gordon, Bridgetown, Barbados, Jan. 7, 1976.

110. "An Agreement Between the Caribbean Publishers and Broadcasters Association and Reuters Limited," June 1974, in Cholmondeley and Gordon, Appendix IV.

111. *Memorandum of Association*, Article 3.

112. *Op. cit.*, p. 22.

113. Harry Mayers, interview with author, May, 1976.

114. Guidebook, *supra*, n. 94.

115. CANA Staff Notice, Bridgetown, Barbados, Jan. 1, 1978.

116. This shareholder was the Jamaica *Daily News*, which went into receivership. Major burdens of that year included increasing the wordage by 100% and increasing the rates paid to stringers.

117. The additional subscribers were: Agency for Public Information, Jamaica; Guyana Government Information Service; Dominica Broadcasting Corporation; Bahamas Radio and Television; Radio ZDK, Antigua; Roots Communications, New York; *Nation*, Barbados; *Torchlight*, Grenada; Tribune Limited, Nassau; Radio St. Vincent; Radio WLIB, New York; *Challenge*, New York; Voice of America and the OAS, Washington.

118. Even the link-up with Prensa Latina on which a draft agreement had been reached in 1975 was still not effected. This was due to both cost and technical difficulties (Minutes of the first Annual General Meeting of Caribbean News Agency Limited, Barbados, March 25, 1977).

119. Harry Mayers interview, Jan. 12, 1979.

120. Oliver Clarke interview, Jan. 5, 1979.

121. Terry Williams, interview with author, Reuters office, Barbados, Jan. 12, 1979.

122. *Daily Gleaner*, March 23, 1979. Report on IAPA meeting, Trinidad, March 22, 1979.

123. *Ibid.*, March 24, 1979.

124. Ken Gordon, "Director's Report for the Financial Year ended December 31, 1976," Bridgetown, Barbados, March 25, 1977.

125. "Chairman's Report on 1977," Bridgetown, 1978.

126. Interview, Jan. 12, 1979.

127. Interview, Jan. 12, 1979.

128. Interview, London, June 27, 1977.

129. Clarke, *op. cit.*

130. Telephone conversations, January and February, 1979.

131. Interview, Jan. 5, 1979.

132. Clarke, *op. cit.*

133. The shareholders were the Guyana *Chronicle*, Radio Jamaica and the Jamaica *Daily News*. Both Radio Jamaica (which had been primarily foreign-owned) and the *Daily News* (which went into receivership) were acquired by the Jamaican government in the first instance. In 1979 government made more than

70% of Radio Jamaica shares available to employees and representatives of people's organizations such as the agricultural society and unions.

134. Interview with author, April 22, 1978. In fact in July, 1980, Guyana objected to CANA stories from Guyana which were unfavorable to the government and pressured CANA to fire two new Guyanese correspondents. The government threatened to cancel subscriptions of two government media by January, 1981, if the correspondents were retained. CANA did not plan to fire its correspondents, and at press time the issue was still unresolved.

135. Clarke, *op. cit.*

136. Minutes of Annual General Meeting, CPBA, Tobago, Nov. 18, 1976.

137. This is reflected, e.g., in the fact that at a CANA training workshop in 1978 funded by the World Press Freedom Committee, two British journalists from Reuters, John Caswell and Terry Williams, were invited to lecture on "Objectivity and Balance in Agency Reporting," and an American editor, Al Fitzpatrick, on "How to Attain Better Reporting and Writing." For a discussion of some implications of the terms "objectivity" and "professionalism," see Cuthbert, *supra*, n. 9.

138. Marlene Cuthbert, "Mass Media and National Development: Case Studies of Jamaica and Guyana," *Caribbean Quarterly* 23:90-105 (December 1976).

139. Canute James, telephone conversation, March 8, 1979.

140. "General Manager's Report," CANA Board Meeting, Bridgetown, May 7, 1977. Oliver Clarke, managing director, and Hector Wynter, chief editor, *Daily Gleaner*, interviews with author, Jan. 5, 1979.

141. Harry Mayers, speech (untitled) to International Seminar on the Infrastructure of News Collection and Dissemination in the World, sponsored by Unesco, Stockholm, Sweden, April 24-27, 1978.